The relation among the sense, the reference and the representation of a proper name

In Frege’s theory, the reference of a proper name indicates the object itself which we designate with
its name.  There is the representation of a word that is entirely subjective.  The sense lies between
the reference and the representation (p.106 sens et denotation).
By taking the example of telescope, Frege explains these notions.  When we look at the moon
through a telescope, the moon itself, Frege states, is the reference. It is there weather we observe it or
not, it is unconditional.  There is the one and only moon despite all the interpretations possible.
The reference for proper names works as the example of telescope.  Frege states proper names as
singulars terms that indicate individual objects. Such as Aristotle, Eiffel tour and the richest man in
Paris are proper names.  These proper names can be the references in the expressions and can have
various senses. Words such as a dog, some cows and any table are not considered as proper names
because they can mean more than one object.  There are concepts-words. Concepts-words do not
indicate an individual object but have references of more general wider terms.
On the other hand, there are phrases that have senses but no reference. Kenny points out in his work
Frege (p.128) that a phrase such as “The celestial body most distant from the Earth” has a sense but
does not contain any reference because there is no such object.  Therefore there is no truth-value in
this expression.
Concerning the telescope, there exist two images in this situation; the first one as the image created
within the telescope and the second as the image observed by the observer.  According to Frege, the
first one is a sense and the second is a representation.
The sense here, in the example of the telescope, is objective because the image given and available
through the lens is the same for anyone who looks into the telescope.  The different image can be
produced by changing the angle or position therefore it creates a different sense but as long as it is
fixed at the same angle, it is unchangeable and has the same sense.
Here is my objection to Frege’s theory of senses. There are not only  objective senses but also
subjective senses.  For example, when a proper name such as Aristotle is given, there will be senses
such as the great philosopher or  a tutor of Alexander the Great.  These senses have the same
reference which is Aristotle but it depends on the person to give each different sense concerning
Aristotle.  It is same for the proper name Elizabeth II.  For same people, she is the actual queen of
England, and for some others, she can be the richest woman in England.  Although the reference is
the same, these senses are strongly subjective. These senses cannot be considered same as the sense
in the telescope which stands itself without coming from through someone’s mind.
However the representation is purely subjective because it is the image and it depends on each
person. Back to the example of the telescope, the representation of the moon how one person
interprets is never the same as another would.  Even if someone observes the moon twice, it can be
interpreted differently according to mood or intention of the person.  It is the same for Aristotle or
Elizabeth II.  The image about Elizabeth II (which is the representation) is different for anyone. It
entirely depends on the interpretation through the senses for each person.
Furthermore, although two may have the same interpretation of the image, it is impossible to
compare these two representations in one consciousness.  Therefore it cannot be said that there are two idential representation.